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-- .----·---- -. 
I~ has long been a contenU.on of underdeveloped countri.f~S c1nd even of 
relatively developed ones, that th~ emign1tion of hinhly ~k:i.lled personnel 
constj_tutes a serious loss which the country sho;,,,lcl try to mi.n:l.m:i.ze. While 
the idea has seldom been expressed in highly theoretical terms, most peoi:,le 
have accepted it intuitively and hnrdly questioned the underlying theory. 
Recently, however, the_ generally acceptec1 point of: vim, has been called 5.nto 
question by Grubel and Scott, 1 who argue that under rnost circuuistnnces t:here 
is no lo_ss to the non··migrants as a result of emraigration, even of highly sk:q­
lecl pen1onnel, from a given country. 
The present discussion attempts to analyze .in considerable detai:I. the 
. condit5.ons uncle:::- which loss to the remaining popuJ.ation?. will occur, con-
It is concluded that, in general, loss does o~cur, although there are~ few 
~ases where gain (or no chan~e)· may result. 
In the firs£ case discussed, ~tis assumed thEt the emigration is a 
once and for all affair and that the supply of resources to the domestic cco., 
ncmy is perfectly inelastic. Because of the latter asst1rnption, this case 
may be thought of as referring to the very short run,. in which resource. 
. sep:_:ilies do not adjust to the itnpact of the migratiou. It is a relatively 
··, . i..G:cubel, Herbert B. and Anthony D. Scott, "The Internat:l.onal Flmt of 
-.Human Capit&l, 11 Amed.can~~~£..~_£H11:i.c Review, }fay 1966. 
2It is assmL1e::l that the emizrants theuselves gain from the move; the 
welfare function with whith we are concerned deals solely with non-migrants 
and disregr.:rJs an individuEtl as soon as he migrates. · Problems are irr.pJ.ic.it 
in this definition but we will not go into detail about them, 
Since the emigrants are excluded from the national welfare function, it 
is particularly necess~ry to assume away interpersonal. utility effects be­
tmc!en e~1igrants and their friends or fanili.es who do noi.: emigr6t_e. Al t1wu.3)1 
viit~ally 211 of co □ s~raer theory is ba~ed on the ~ssu~~iicm of indepzndent 
utility functions, such an assumption may ·bs pariicul~~l.y ill-suited to the 
analysis of the 1uestion at hand, and ~ill be relaxed in this paper.· 
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simple case; the major determinarits of the extent of gain or loss are (a) the 
ratio of per cent of all capital held by emigrants to per cent of all labor 
supplied by emigrants, and (b) the amount of their physical capital which the 
emigrants take with them. It is clear also that srich things as the existence 
of: external effects related to the emig:rants, or increasing returns to scale, 
can affect the results but the only interesting question is whether such ef­
fects are quantitatively importa_nt, since their d:trect:l.ort is theoretically 
obviow; .. 
The analysis becomes more complex when readjustment of factor supplies 
and factor proportions to the migration is allowed for. If there are only 
two factors, the results depend on the relative scvings propensities of emi•-
grants an~1 non~emigrants, and on whether the ernigr;u1ts take their capital 
with th~n or not. Results are suwnarize<l in Table 2, farther on. When there 
are three or more factors (permitting the distinction between skilled and un-
skilled labor) the result depends jointly on the relative savings propensi-
ties,_ the skill levels of migrants and non-migr~nts, the ease of transforming 
unskillE:d into skilled labor, and the existence of government subsidies to 
education. 
·The Short-Run Effects of Emigration-. .. -- .,.____ . --
following: perfect markets, no external effects, constant returns to scale, 
I 
independent utility functions (:i.n the sense that one person's indifference 
level_ does not affect that of another person), and a two-factor world, in 
-3-
which.one factor is capital and the other is homogeneous labor. Factors are 
continuously substitutable and prices are flexible so that factor markets a;:e 
always cleared. The marginal utility of income is assumed to be equal for 
all owners of factors of production. 
The effects of an emigration on the income of the non-emigrants depends 
· on the way in which the ownership of the capital stock is distributed among­
the people in the country, and whether the emierants tAke their phys:i.cal capi­
tal with them or receive instead the remuneration corresponding to the return 
on physical capital, which they leave behind thE!m. 
Assume fhst the simplest possible case in which none of the laborers 
who miorate own any of the capital stock. Here it is clear that as long as 
' 0 
the rna;:ginal physical productivity of labor is declining, the individuals 
left in the country after the migration are worse off than they were before 
it. · This is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure I, The marginal phy­
s!.c<Jl p:roduct · of labor curve is designated by MPPL,·and the initial labor 
stock, measured on the horizoi1tal axis, is OL1. Total product is given by 
the area benecith the marginal physical product of labor _curve, i.e., OACL1. 
Suppose now that 121.1 workers emigrate reducing the labor force to OL2. 
The new total product of the economy is given by the area OL\BL2 • Hhereas 
the original equilibrium wage rate was OE, the new and higher wage rate is 
OF. Since the migrants.ow,n no capital stock, their income1 before migrating 
is L2DcL1 • The income of the rest of the population at this time is there­
fore OACDL2 • After the migration the income of the remaining inhabitants 
is OABL2, less than their original level by the triangle BCD. 
Note th~t in this case, the avera~e inccme ·p_Pr pPrs 01, 1·.n t' t" ( h~ l_ - -- , ne na ion ,., ,.c 1 








incr~ases c1s a result of the migration, even though the avera~,,;e income:: of that 
particular set of persons remaining in the co~ntry _is lowered . 1 This super­
ficial paradox can be explained by the fact that-the emigrants (since they 
owned no capital) had a below average income level before their migration. 
Consider now an alternative in which the- ownership of the capital stoc!, 
is equally distributed among all the individuals in the population, each of 
whom also belongs to the labor force which, as before, is assumed to be homo-
geneous. Assume also that an individual who lec1ves the country still owns 
his cap Hal and receives the appropriate factor payment. Again we ask our-·· 
selves whether the income per person of the set of ind:i.viduals remaining in 
the country is greater before or after the emig~ation, Consider Figure 1 
.again. Define 11 such that equals l , i.e., suppose thRt one 
11 
nth of the population has decided to emigrate. This tells us that the in-
come of the non-migrating group before the migration occurred was equal to 
X + n·-1 (Z + Y + T), where X is equal to the· area OEDLz, z is equal
n 
to the nrea ABF , Y is equal to the area_ FBDE , and T is equd to the 
area BCD • After the migration has occurred the "income of the remaining 
population is giv~n by X + Y + E:l. (Z) • It is easy to show that the in-
n 
come before the migration is in this case less than the income after the 
--- _l __ ,____ 
We assume implicitly throughout this paper that there is a constant 
r4tio between the labor force and the total population both as between 
emigrants and non--emigrants and through time, To the extent that this is 
not true, conclusions which can be drawn as to the effects on the inco,n~ 
per worker do not ililply parallel statca12nts as to the e£fects on incor,1e 
per pe-;.-so,t. 
-6-
The conclusion th6t emigration ian help the remaining population only if 
the emigrants we;:-e owners of some capital stock, but is sure to hurt the re--
maining population H the emigrants did not hold any capital stock, · is at first 
sight rather paradoxical. One might have expected that since the emigration 
of labor increases the capital labor ratio that the remaining inhabitants wouJ.tj 
be better off in the latter case. But it is here that the distinction must be 
carefully 1wde between changes in the income level of the group of people who 
were in the country before the emigration and st.ill there after it, and clwnges 
i11 the avcrai:;e income level of all ~he people in the countr.y. he.fore the en1:'.'.­
grat ion and all the people in the country after it. The average income of the 
people in the country c1t the respective before and after dates does increase 




Y + n-1 
·n 





(Z + Y + T). 
Y > n-1 (Y + T) , 
n 
which reduces to: 
Y. > (n-l)T • 
It is obvious from Figure 1 that this inequality holds. 
2The analysis of this section has been based on the assumption that the 
marginal physical product curve of labor is declining throughout its entire 
range. It is clear that our conclusion that the non-emigrants are worse off 
if the emigrants hold no cc1pit_al stock is not qualified by the shc1pe of the _ 
marginal physico.l productivity curve, as long as there is 8.n equilibr.iu2 where 
the. curv2 is dc;•:rn-i2rd sloping. Since distribution theory bi:eclks · doun if this 
is not true we c2.n limit ourselves to this case. Hhen the er:iignmts do o,._1n 
the same amount of capital per. p~rson a~ the non-emigrants, the result just. 
achieved can be re-versed, .even when an e·qu:i.librium exists. 
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as a result of the emigration, but this is consistent with a dec:cease in the 
income of the set of people who remain in the country. 
Given the·two cases just discussed, It is clear that there exists in this 
model some ratio of m-mersh:i.p of cap_ital per emigrant to ownership of capital 
per non-emig:rant at which the non-emigrants Hill be left just ·as well off as 
they were before the migration. This situation occurs when the per cent of all 
capital held by the non-emigrants is equal to y 1,2 This conditiony + T ...... 
implies that non-emigrants hold a larger per capita share of the capital stock 
than ernig·,.·ants. 3 
Let a=% of all capital stock held by non-emigrants. 
Then the incomes of non-emigrants, before migration and after migration re­
spectively, can be represented as folloi·lS: 
_before: X + a (Z + Y + T) 
after: X + Y + aZ 
For equality we require 
a(Z + Y + T) :::: Y + aZ , 
i.e., a:::: _Y_
y +·T 
2When the HPP curve of labor is not a decreasing function of_ labor inputthroughout its entire range, the critical distribution of capital stock whichhas the property·tbat emigration w{ll not affect the incomes of non-emigrantswill differ from the case treated here. 
3 .The proportion of non-emigrants in. the "before migratio~' population is 
n-1 From F . 1 . ' higure it is seen tat n-1 =- EDn If the proportion of then EC
total capital stock held by non-emigrants j.s _:x.__ then the per cc.pita hold­
ing of capital stock by non-emigrants is larger
Y+T
than that by ei.11ig;:.·.:1nts, sir;ce, 
_'L_ > ED or _!_ >. n-1
Y+T - EC Y+T n 
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Until now it has been assumed that if an emigrant did own .physical capital 
or the rights to it he_did not take it with him when he emigrated. Consider 
now the case where the emigrant does take his capital with him, l In this con­
text the fol low:i.ng proposition is very useful: 
Given constant returns to scale, whenever a bundle of factors 
is removed from an economy and the relative amo~nts of the 
different factors in that bundle are not the same as the rela-
tive amounts of the factors in the economy as a whole before 
the removal, then the average income of the individuals left 
in the economy after the migration will be lower than it was 
before; if the relative· proportions are the same, th8 ,tVerage 
incorne of the individuals left in the economy will be unchanged .2, 3 
Applying this pro?o~{tion to the extreme cases, we conclude that if a 
group of laborers ,-iho own no capital stock leaves then there is a decrease 
in the inco:ne of the remaining population (as we have already sec above); 
on the other hand, if the entire ~tock of physical cap.itaJ. is removedJ again 
the aver.-ige income of the remaining population ts decreased. · Hore generally, 
1When human capital is introduced its departure along with the basic labor 
component must clearly be allowed for. In.the case of physical capital, if 
the emigrant sells a stock, for example, this may lead to a decrease of the 
country's capital stock in the long run, as stock flotation becomes more ex­
pensive. The result, therefore, may be the s.:imc as if he had "carried" the 
stoclt off with him. · 
2It is assume~ throughout this paper that any non-labor factors which 
leave the country as a result of t;he migration are owned by the migrants them- • 
selves. 
3This proposition is a sort of analogue of the general theorem in inter­
national·trade that whenever trade in goods or movements of factors between 
two previously closed econornj_es is made possible then the income of each eco­
nomy is increased as a result of the contact with the other one, provided 
that fcictor proportions were not th,~ same in th~ two econoiT!ies b0fore trc,de. 
But if factol:" propo:::-tions w,•.re the sar.:e before the opening up of trade then 
no trade or factor movement will occur and no gaics will be reap2d. 
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labor and capital which leave the economy are not in the sc1m~whenever the 
proportion as in the pre-migration economy then there is a decrease in the 
. i 
per capita income of the remaining population.1· 
The results of this section are sum.111arized in Table 1. 
The Case_of Hore Than THo Factors 
The existence of different types of labor~ or the existence of land as 
noa factor of production changes the analysis to the extent thatiit may 
longer be possible to assume that the area under the marginal productivity 
curve of the factor is equal to the total output. The shape of such a mar­
ginal physical productivity curve depends on the extent to which other fac-
tors are substitutable for or complementary with the factor in question. If 
s01ne other type of labor is a very close substitute, then the marginal pro-· 
If the factor has close substi­cluctiYity cu:cve wUl be relatively .flat. no 
tutes, then its marginal physical productivity curve will tend to be more 
.steeply sloped. 
The originai conclusions which were drm,h from Figure I in the case of 
a homogeneous labor force which owned no capital remain true in the case of 
any sub-sector of the labor force whose merabe:rs do not qwn capital. Whenever 
a non-marginal proportion of this labor force emigrates the loss triangle 
appears. Someone in the remaining population must be worse off. It is not 
possible to perform the same simple diagrammatic analysis of the effects on 
ownthe remaining population if the type of labor that emigrates does indeed 
capital; for thL:; one Hould need a more c01,1plicated production function 
lrt is clear that our results here, as in previous sections, would be 
~edified if there were either increasing returns to scale or decreasi.ng re­
turns to scale in the economy. In general, the loss .resulting from ths 
dcp~rture of any· factor would be greater if there were increaiing returns 
ancI less if the:re were decreasing returns. 
Table 1 
Sm,!mary of Resul Ls in the Short-Run or Static
Case with Two ·Factors 
Capital Owned Pei Person
by Emig.E.._a_n_t_s___
Capital Owned Per Person .Emigrants Don't Emigrants Take.





























c;j 0c., ,, t--1 
1. o( == Ratio of Capital Owned Per Person by Emigrants to Capital .Dwned Per
Person by Non-Emigrants .. 
Note: "Gain" and "Loss" as elsewhere in this paper, refer only to the non-­emigrants. 
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approach in which all types of labor and capital were introduced and the ef­
fects of the departure of a certain number of a particular type of labor could 
be calculated. In any c.sse, however, the conceptual apparatus which one must 
use is relatively clear-cut and sinple. 
The Long Run: The Dynamic Stationary ·Economy; Factor Proportions Analysis and 
Educational Costs 
So far, it ha<> been assumed that the total stock of each factor is fixed 
in a timeless soit of ~ay, with changes occurring only as a result of migration, 
and with these changes not being made up for in any t..vay afterw2rcls, as, for 
example through the creation of more of a factor when its price rises. Consider 
now a model which, although still a very oversimplified version of reality, 
permits the introduction and analysis of some of the longer run effects of 
emigration. It is a stationary equilibrium.model in which, in the absence 
·of emigration, it is assumed tlrnt although people are born and die and fac­
tories are built and wear outJ all fhe aggregate variables like the labor 
force and the capital stockl in the country are constant over time. 
The Two Factor Case 
If, in the sort of long run model just postulated,there are only two 
1
This assumption is consistent with a situation in which the typical 
individual ends his life with the same capital stock as he started it. One 
can assume that thf~e is no bequeathing, in whicfi case individuals will 
usually save during periods ,:hen their incomes are high and dissave in the 
latter part of their lives. The sacie sort of r~lationship between the life-
.time pattern of income ancl that of conscmption would presumably hold also 
where each individual received a bequest from his parents and passed the 
same amount on to his children. One must make one of these two assumptions 
of the system would not be a stationary on2. 
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factors, and emigrants do not retain investments in the country after dcpartine, 
it is Jhe relative saving.5 propensities of the '.emigrants and non-emigrants 
which play the role taken in the short-run case by the relative amounts of 
capital held. The result is analogons; whenever the ~verage saving propen-
sity of the emigrants is different from that of the non-emignmts, then the 
latter lose as a result of the emigration. hssumc that there is no bequeath­
ing so that saving is done only in order to redistribute the pattern of an 
individual's consumption over his life. If a group does no saving at all, 
it has a~ over-life consumption pattern identical to its income pattern, A 
group ~fl1ich saveB has a different patt~rn of incdme and consumption. During 
the early working years, income is greater than consumption so that net 
.saving is taking place. During the last years of life dissaving occurs . 1 
f;n ahove 2verage savings propensity means that with a given interest rate 
an individual saves more than the representative individual during his life and 
by implication, in the case ~hen no bequeathing occurs, dissaves faster during 
the -latter part ol his life. 2 The absolute amount saved depends on the mar-
ginal efficiency of capital,the greater the rate of return on savings in 
terms of intreased consumption at a later time, the grea~er will usually 
be the total amount of saving done.3 Thus this case differs from the short 
run case in that savings (and hence capital formation) are linked to the rate 
lit: is assmned that net domestic sav:i.ngs fi.nances investment in real 
capital in the economy (an<l not in other countries) so that the total capital 
stock at any given time is equal to the total of all net savings to date, 
21£ bequec1thing is done for the economy as a whole, a high savings p1.·o­
pensity would be reflected in a high equilibrium level of wealth given the 
rate of interest. 
3It is true, of course, that there is an income effect as well as a 
price effect of the chan3es in the rate of interest; hm-iever, the case where 
savings are a decreasing function of tbe rat~ of interest i.s not treated here. 
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of interest so that the capital a person holds is not given exogenously but 
rather dep~nd.s on market forces. It is still possible, however, to dis-
. tinguish high and low savers or capital holders, even when the amounts of 
capital are not fixed. 
Suppose that the economy is made up of t\/O equally large sets of indi-· 
viduals ,- _one of which has a high savings tendency and the other a low one. 
In all other respects they are the same. Consider Figure 2 • MPPK is the 
curvemarginal physical productivity of capital curve. ST is tlxe supply of 
loam1blc funds (or what might be called the "willingness to hold weal th
11 
) 
from the group with the high propensity to save and VW isthe corresponding 
curve of the low s,rvers. The equilibrium capital stock is OK1 and the 
equilibrium rate of interest is OC ~ The total returns to capital are 
given by the c:irea designated by OCRK1 , ·while the rest of the area 
under 
the marginal physical productivity of capital-curve corresponds to the re­
muneration of labor. 
savers emigrate.Now assume, to take a simple case, that all of the high 
Since the curve VH has an intercept above C, the non-emigrants dicl no 
saving at all before the emigration. Nou with one half ~f the labor having 
emigrated, the ne,•! marginal physical productivity of capital curve can be 
designated by MPPK • The precise relationship between this curve and the 
original marginal. physical productiyity of capital curve depends on the pro­
duction function; however, given the assumption of constant returns to scale, 
it is obvious that if the amount of capital stock were one half of OK1 , 
i.e., OK2 , then the total product of the economy would be 
one half of its 



























In fact, the c·apital stock
l-1PPK_' , (C!iH) would be one--htl1.f of the areo CAR 
• 
I 
0K2 _since at the rate of interest CC the peop
le cur-
will be less than 
rently living in the country do not save at all. 
The equilibrium capit~l 
crosses the new marginal phy-stock is deter.mined by the point at which · VH 
Hence the equili-
sical productivity of capital curve, i.e., the p
oint F 
Total income in tbe economy is now. brium ~apital stock is given by 0K3 
The amount accruing to the non-emigrants in thegiven by the area 01\FK. 3 
!1FP The return to capital is given byform of wage payments iG given by 
the level of ,-,elfare of the nan-emigrants before 
the emi­
Compare, now, 
The payment received before the migration is give
n hy
gration and after it. 
and the payment accruing nfterwards by 0i\FK3 • 
Superficially,
the areo CAH 
it appears that th0 we] far.e level is greater in 
the latter case, but such a 
comparison fails to take account of the fact tha
t the non-emigrants, in order 
have ha<l to change. the time: pattern ofto maintain the capital stod~ 01(3 , 
Each individual now saves duringtheir consuraptiori fro:n what it was _before. 
the early part of his income earning life and run
s down his assets during the 
later part of his life. In the pre-emigration ec
onoray, ·with a rate of inter­
est given by 0C, this set of individuals did no
 saving but preferred to 
Part of the increased in-consume currently their total income of CAM. 
come which they receive in the second case is a 
payment necessary to per.:. 
.
suade them to save during the early part of their
 lives and dissave during • 
the latter part, rather than consume their curren
t income throughout their 
The amount of this payment can be shown diagramm
atically by the area
lives. 
are.a 0VFK.3 It is the arnou·nt by \·1hich the asset-
•h0lders in the econony 
feel .themselves to be worse of:f when they have to hold assets (:i.,e., post-
pone consumption) for one more period, In the original case such postponing 
never occurred; hence it is necessary to subtract out this amount (OVFK3) 
from the t:otal_ income accruing to the non-emigrants before making the com­
parison with the pre-migration income. The area which must be compared with 
CAM is -VAF which is clearly the smaller of the two, Hence, the non-
emigrants are in a worse position than they were before the emigration occurred, 
- To distinguish bet·ween this adjusted income level and the unadjusted one, 
we henceforth des:i.gn2ted the former as 11 permanent income," 
Figure 2 sinply illustrates the general proposition that whenever the 
emigrants h~ve an ayerage savings tendency different from that of the non­
emigrants, then the non-emigrant~ are worse off than before. This proposition 
is further clcrificd in Figure 3, which differs from Figure 2 only in that 
varying savings propensities on the part of the emigrants and non-eQigtants 
arc considered. SNZ , the total supply curve of loanable funds is, hm-1ever, 
held fixed. Let the supply curve of loanable funds for "low savers" be LL1 
and let it cut the line CR so that at the interest rate OC the low savers 
supply an amount of funds CB·. The supply curv~ of the h~gh savers can be 
derived as the horizontal distance between SZ and LL' , i.e., SHH' Our 
welfare measure for the low savers before any emigration occurs is now ACH + 
LCB and for the high savers ACN + SCJ If the high savers emigrate, the 
"welfc1re" of the low savers would becor.1e L,\Q with an equilibrium capital stock 
. L
of OKl~ • This is lm1er than the pre-emigration rfhcome by the area BQN • 
If the low savers emigrate, the income of the high savers who would then be 























Quauiity of Capital 
Fisurc 3 
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clear that the non-emigrants lose in all possible cases except when LL' and 
SHH' coincide (at least at the interest rate OC ); but this is precisely the 
case in which they do bave the same savings propensities. 
Thus far we have assumed that emigrants have done what is equivalent to 
taking their capital with them, i.e., they have not retained investments in 
the country, but have sold them to non-emigrants, thus using up some of the 
savings of the latter group. 
In the case where the two groups have the same savings propensities and 
the emii;rants do not take their physical capital with them, the non-emigrants 
may be benefited by the emigration. The capital left in the country by the 
emigrants increases the capital-labor ratio and reduces its own rate of re­
turn. The Eituation is illustrated in Figure 4. One-half of the population 
has emigrated and the marginal phusical productivity of capital curve and 
lettering are those of Figure 3. The supply curve of loanable funds of the 
·non-emigrants is given by the line SD, which cuts the marginal physical pro­
ductivity curve at the point M due to the assumption that the tendency to 
save is the same for emigrants and non-emigrants. In other words, if none of 
the emigrants' capital had remained in the country the equilibrium rate of 
interest wot1ld have been at its original level of OC • The income of the 
non-emigrants, the sum of the wages which accrued to the non-emigrants before 
emigrationJ (CAH)" and tJ-ie .gain from their contribution to the capital stock 
(SCM) would 1ikewise have been at
I 
its original level. · That some of the capi-
tal belonging to the emigrants remains in the country can be represented by 
the fact that the total supply curve of loanable funds ST' , will lie to the 
right of SD . The new equilibrium raJ~c of interest is given by OG and the 
total wage bill accruing to the non-e:nfgrants is nm.; given by the area GAN. 











Quantity of Capital 
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SGU • It is obvious that the latter income (SGU + G,\N) is greater than the 
former (SCL-1 + CAM:) the difference being the area UNN • 
Table 2 summarizes the conclusions in this long-run two-factor case. 
The Two-Plus Factor Case: Different Labor Skills 
Consider now the possibility that; emigrants and non-emigrants may differ} 
not only with respect to savings propensities; but also with respect to skill 
levels. · _Unskilled labor can be transformed into skilled labor by educational 
investment. When the stationary dynamic model, which _is th~ current framework 
of analysis, is in <lynani.c equilibrium, the only investment ocCLirring in e<lu-. 
cation is that required to offset depl2tions in the stock of skilled labor 
through rei:irerr,ent and death. 1£ the assumptions made throughout the paper 
(internal factor mobility, perfect markets, etc.), are expanded to include 
perfect foreslzht and no risk aversion, the transformation of one type of 
labor into another by means of education would occur automatically up to the 
point where the benefits and costs accruing ih the future, discounted by the 
rate of interest, would just equal the current costs of the educational pro­
c;::-.ss. Each individual wculci take care o[ his own education in such a way as 
to maximize his discounted income stream. What then would happen in this 
stationary economy if either a temporary or a continuing outflow of one type 
of labor occurs? 
It can be shown that if emigrant and non-emigrant savings propensities 
are the same, and if unskilled l~bor is transformable at a constant cost into 
skilled labor, any emigration of either skilled or unskilled labor will not 
affect income per person for the non-emigrants as long as it is•foreseen so 
that the time lag involved in education does not leave factor proportions 
different from their long-r~n equilibrium values. If skilled labor is 
-16a-
Table 2 
The Two Factor Dynamic Stationary Case 
Savinr;s Pr~_Pe~~sitv of Em!B.E~E.
Savings Propensity of Non­ Emigrar{ts Take Emigrants Leave
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1. R = Ratio of Savings Propensity of Er.ii3rants to Savings Propensity of Non­Emigrants. 
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emigrating then the educational sector will have to be larger to make sure 
that even after the emigration the ratio of skilled labor to unskilled labor 
and to physical capj_tal is the same as it would be in the absence of the 
migration, If unskilled labor emigrates) the educational sector will, con-
v ersely, have to be smaller. 
If there are 11 increasing costs111 to educating higher and higher propor­
tions ~f the population (or absolute numbers) to skilled levels, then emi­
gration of skilled workers implies loss to the non-emigrants even in the 
long run; emigration of unskilled workers implies a gain. These results 
are reversed :i.f there are decreasing costs in education. 
Govcrnment__Subsj_c1ies to Education 
With free capital markets and no risk aver~ion, one wovld expect each 
individual to take care of his oim education in such a way as to maxiraize 
his overall discounted productivity. Because individuals are risk ave,:se 
or lack information, and capital markets are not perfect) it is usually be-
lieved that the amount ·of investment in education which would occur without 
any government assistance would be less than the optimal amount. As a 
result) the gove~nment intervenes, and gives educational subsidies. 
Such a situation suggests in some sense that the loss to the remaining 
population cis a result of emigration of skilled personnel will be greater 
1In the present context, by increasing costs we mean to include not only
the possibility that total costs r_nay rise faster than the r.t.:nber of people edu­
cated because of decreasing returns to thQ industry with the innate quJlity
of .students constant (a rather implausible event) but also that as more and 
more people are educated, the additional students arc less and less suitable 
and hence do not gain as much fro □ a givei1 level of educational cost. 
,.: 
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than ·it was in the preceding ana~ysis, The emi3ration of an individual who 
has borne his own educational expenses is one thing;· whatever decrease in 
consumption had to be sustained in order that he ~e educated was borne by 
himself. Howe:ver, when a subsidy policy is in effect the decrease in con­
sumption which finances the investment in education is borne to a large 
degre~ by the population which~iill remain after the emigrant leaves. This 
particular part of the loss to the remaining population is equal to the 
total government subsidy gbing into the education of the emigrants. 
Interdependen_t Utility Func_t._ion~ 
If each individual is thought of as a unit whose welfare is independent 
of that of every other individual, then the non-emigrant population as a. 
\·1hole loses a p:eatcr amount when the uigrants' e<lu.u1tion has been ~uIJ.sj_­
dized than when this is not the case. Suppose, hm•:ever, thc>.t the. men,ber s 
of a particular family tend to think of their welfare as a whole. The 
parents are happier if the children are well off. In this case if 2 
father pays for the education of his son1 the fa~her may not feel any worse 
off if the son eventually emigrates than he would if the son remained in 
his own country. Hhether the father pays for the e_ducation of his son di­
rectly, or indi!:ectly through a tax and benefits system via the government, 
makes no real difference. As long as the distribution of benefits from 
public education is propo_rtional t~ the taxes which result from the need 
to make these e:-:pe.nditm::es, the far:iil ies of the non-emigrants are in essence 
paying for the education of their children and the families of the emigrants 
are pciyinr; for the: education of their children. Clearly, then, the f& ..1ilies 
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of the non-emigrants are not hurt by the migration since they have not in 
! 
fact helped to pay for the education of the emigra~ts' children, Similarly, 
the families of the ~migrants have not lost, since by assumption, they 
would be just as happy to have their children educated and then leave the 
country as to have them educ:ated and stay in it. In this case there is no 
"subsidization" loss from migration. 1 
. The same conclusion holds even when, as a result of the emigration, 
the governm-2nt increases the number of children receiving education. The 
non-emigrants continue to pay a proportion of the total educational bill 
equal to the per cent of all students being educated who are from their 
families, Although the total tax bill for purposes of education is higher 
for the non"'"emigrants than before, more of their children are being edu­
cated. These two factors just offset each other. 2 To the extent, of 
course, that the extra children who have to be educated as a result of 
the dep~rture of the emigrants are less suited than the ones educated first, 
the economy as a whole suffers a loss. This loss possibility has already 
been considered (increasing costs of education); there is no added loss as 
1It must be borne in mind that there may be loss due to changed factor 
proportions, different savings propensities, etc., but that we are here con­
cerned ~nlv with whether there is a further loss..- due to government subsidization,· 
2we assume that the government is, as before, ensurini that-optimal -
number of childr,en be educated. It is probable that the non-emigrants would 
be unwilling to increa-se ·their savings (either directly or through taxes paid • 
to the government) sufficiently ,to maintain the same factor proportions(among 
physical capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor) as before. Thi.s fact 
has its own welfare implications, i.e., those already discussed above. The 
"effective rate" of savings of the group of fa;niJ. ies whose children emigrate 
will be decreased by the emigration inasmuch as this human capital is lost 
to the economy, so that the f.;railies of the non-emig_rants would gain or lqse 
on· this account accorc1.ing to whether their savings propensities_ were, re­
spectively: higher or lower than th2 r- 0£ the families of the e:rigrants. 
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a result of the fact that government subsidies for education are a feature of 
the situation. 
It is clear that in tho analysis of this problem it is not safe to use 
the assumption of an independent utility function for each individual. If one 
assumes that parents receive an increase in utility sufficient to compe~sate 
them for the costs of educating their children, then the conclusion. that 
government educational subsidies to people who emigrate result in a loss to 
the remaining population is not valid. The problem clearly cannot be solved 
by the use of ecoaornic theory. The implications of the two types of utility 
functions on the part of th~ emigrants' families are different with respect 
to the optimal gove~nment educational strategy in a situation where emigra­
tion is likely to occur. Hhen the families of the ~migrants c!l"C paying (in 
a sense voluntarily) for the education of their children with the government 
acting as an intermediary (and one form of labor is tr2nsformable into 
another at constant costs), then the implications for governmental policy 
are fairly straightforuard. There is no loss to non-emigrants th1:ough sub-
sidies to emigrants no matter how large the educational sector inthe country 
is or how r:iany people emigrate, (assuming th_at the governmerrt acts with fore­
sight so that it is never caught off-guard by a sudden wave of emigrants). 
Independent Utility Functions 
The implications for government policy are considerably n~re complicated 
when the opposite extrea~ assumption is made; nnmely, that the families of 
the emigrants are just as unwilling to pay for the education of their chil-
dren as are the families of non-e;::1ig1: 2.nts. Uncle:!." these assun:ritions and given 
the possibility of emigration, it may not r)av the government to give as larr,e' , 
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subsidies as in a situation where emigration does not occur; or conversely, 
it may pay the government to educate more people'. 
To make this analysis n little more pr·ecise, assume that the emigration 
occurs in response to a w2ge differential between the country in question 
and countries to which the ~migrants go. The probabili.ty that any one indi­
vidual will emigrate can be assumed to be an increasing function of this dif­
ferential. Suppose the optimal annual production of skilled manpower under 
the assumption of no emigration is known. Now if emigration occurs and the 
government continues to subsidize students to the same extent B::/ before, 
the nu~Jer remaining in the country will decrease. The stock of skilled 
manpower in the country wi.11 become constant at some equilibrium level smal­
ler than in the closed economy; hence the ,rngc will be higher. The trai.nins 
of .another wo;:ker would clearly pay off if the government could b2 sure tbat 
he would stay in the country, sine~ th~ marginal productivity of this type of 
labor is now higher than it was in the closed economy and the costs of train­
1ing are ~resumably the same. But if he emigrates early in life then the 
investment in him is thought of by the government' as being lost. Hhether the 
1rt is assumed that the government is interested in max1m1z1ng the 
total income of everyone in the economy. ThusJ for education to pay off 
.it i.s not necessary that it pay off for anyone but the individual on whom 
the expenditure is incurred. So the sense in which an investment does not 
pay off if the individual emigrates is simply that with his emigration the 
governoent's intere~t in him suddenly disappears. This may appea~ to be 
a rather strange concept but it is implicit in the assumptions which have 
been made above. The government is, concerned only with the set of ind iv i­
duals in the country at a point in time, and in discounting future income 
it concerns itself only with the set of individuals in the country at each 
given point in the future. So the improvement in the welfare of any in­




government should now undertake a more or less rapid production of high•• 
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skilled labor than in ·the closed economy depends on the way in which the 
probability that a worker will emigrate from the country depends on the wage 
he receives in the country. 
The relevant relationships are illustratetl diagramatically in Figure 5. 
· O_n tht right side the stock of skilled labor in the economy is measured on -
the horizontal axis. The line, CC' , gives the total cost per unit of skil­
led labor educated as a function of the stock of skilled labor. The benefits, 
measured as the difference between the wage streams for skilled and unskilled 
labor over the working life of the individual, discounted to present v.:ilue, 
are also a function of the stock of skilled la~or, 1 and the line BB' gives 
· the benefit resulting from the addition of one more skilled laborer. The 
line HsWs I gives the ·wage rate of skilled labor as a function of its stock 
and the line w u H u I gives the wage of unskilled labor as a function of the 
stock of skilled labor, BB' is derived as the vert~cal distance between 
these two lines. It has a negative slope. The intE:rsection of CC' ancl 
BB I at point F gives the optimal stock of labor in an economy from ,-,h ich 
there is no emigration. 
The height of the line t·lswHs,.r' gives the world wase rate for skilled 
labor. The distance between BB and Hs,Ps,. ' (given by. the. curve DD) re.,.
7 
presents the differenc~ b~tween the world and domestic skilled labor wage 
rates as a function of the domestic stock of skilled l3bor, 
In the left half of Figure 5 the curve JJ 1 relates the percent of 
lAlternatively, both costs and benefits could be measured in terms of 
weeks or months, with the cost then being that weekli or monthly amount which 
if it had to be p:_ricl over the inclividt.l--c,1 1 s ,wrld.ng life a;:1d ,-.1ere discour.tec1 
to present value would just equal the actual cosf of the education. 
I 
<











__T ___ _ 





H2- -1. - f ·-
LOO 0G2 Gl 50 L2 Ll 
j) 




working life spent in the country of origin, measured on the horizontal axis, 
to the wage differential, measured on the vertical axis. The larger the wage 
~iffercntial, tl1e greater is the likelihood of emigration for the representa­
tive worker and/or the greater percentage of his working life will be _spent 
outside the country. It is assumed that when the domestic and foreign wage 
rates are equal individuals will spend their whole working life in their coun­
try of origin. 
The curve tt relates the percent of working life spent at home to the 
average cost of the stock of skilled labor in terms of educational expenditures. 
If there is no migrrttion (tl1e per cent of working life spent at home is 100), 
the average cost of maintaining a stock of skilled labor is given by OC • How­
ever if the representative person educated spends only 50 per cent of his work­
ing life in the country, then the average cost of the stock of skilled labor 
is twice OC . 
It is ncM possible to show how the stock of skilled labor is related to 
the average cost per unit educated. If the stock is OL1, then the domestic 
wage differential betm~en skilled and unskilled. labor is given by. L1A1 , and 
the differential between the domestic and world wages for skilled labor by 
L1E1, also equal (by construction) to G1H1 . The per cent of working life 
spent at home is given by OG1 . The average cost of the stock of skilled 
labor given that the per·cent of working life spent at home is OG1, is equal 
to G1K1 or equivalently L1M1 . , A similar procedure for the stock 012 
yields an average cost of L2M2 The locus of such points gives an average 
cost curve in the presence of possible emigration as defined by the curve 
JJ' This curve is r:;iven by CPHi1·I1Q 
Under the extreme nssumption that the government has to pay the.full 
cost of education, the optimal capital stock can be deduced from the point 
at which the BB' 1 ini:~ intersects the curve marginal to the aver2ge cost 
curve M2N1Q . The marginal curve is given by CPRS, so the equilibrium 
stock would be OL3 • The optimal capital stock is, as one would expec~, 
smaller than it would be if emigration uere not a possibility. The number 
of people being educated may be greater or less than in the no emigration 
case. 
In a situation where there is no emigration the optimal amount of edu­
cation is the seme whether there is no rish: aversion or imperfection of 
capital m;:irkets (so that individuals can pay for their own education) or 
whether there are such imperfections and the government is required to make 
the~ payments. 1:!1ere government subsidies are requi~ec1 but ar.e only pa1:tial 
payments of the total cost of education, it is still correct to represent 
the benefits curve by BB, but the marginal costs and average costs to the 
non-emigrants can no longer be represented as they ~re here. Suppose, for 
example, that the emigrant pays SO.per cent of the costs of his education 
and the re.st is met by government subsidy. Then the height of the 2vcrage 
cost curve per unit of stock of skilled labor is equal to the vertical 
distance OC (representing the full educatiorial cost of an individual who 
does stay in the country) plus 50 per cent of the addition to the average 
cost per unit stock retained in the country re:,ulting from the fact that 
some emigrate. Hence, the average cost curve in this situation would be 
the CC curve to the ri~;ht as far as the point P and then would be one­
half as much above the CC curve as is our original uverage cost curve 
N/f1Q1 . The relevant marginal cost curve ,wuld be m2~·ginal to· this newly 
defined average cost curve. The equilibrit!m amount of educ,2tion would 
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clearly be larger in the situation where a larger proportion of the cost is 
borne by the individual recd.ving the education. 
Government Wage l'EL!~J-es 
An alternative to a policy of subsidies to education as a means of main-
taining a desired stock of skilled labor is a ~olicy of subsidizing wages, 
which would reduce emigration of a given type of skilled labor by reducing, 
for thc:it type of labor, the wage diffcrenticl between this country and the 
rest of the world. Such a policy never pays in the short run. This proposi-­
tion is illustrated in Figure 6 (which corresponds to Figure 1) where tht:! 
loss to the n~_n-emigra_nts from th_e departure of L1L2 workers is measured 
by .the trj.angle BCD. The amount which non-migtants would have to pay to 
ell of these potential migrants to persuade them to remain in the country 
is given by the rectangular area ACBD Since the area of ACBD is great-
er than the area of the triangle BCD, the p~licy would cost the non­
emigrants more than they would. gain by having· the emigrants remain. 
The conclusion derived in the short-run static case does not always 
hold in the dynamic C<'.S,; where there are government subsidies to eclucc:tion. 
Figure 7, of the same general format as Figure 5, shows hot,J the ·wage sub­
sidy policy could benefit the non-emigrants. Assume that the government
' 
already has an optimal education sibsidy policy, as defined in Figure S, and 
as a result, the stock of skilled labor is OL3 . Wit
hout asking whether it 
is an optimal policy we arbitrarily assume the government subsidizes wages 
1
of .skilled labor by an amount DDS This shifts the wage differential 
curve DD' downwards to D5 D9 ' • The orig
inal average cost and marginal 
1It would be possible to discuss the choice of the optimal wage sub­
sidy but ue are here co,1ccrned only \,ith. sho,.;ing that sor:1e subsidies can 
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ccst cu::-vcs oE t:i'.' s!:~_llH1. V:bo::.:- 3toc1~ c1re CPQ and CPRS . The new ones, 
anu. respectively. By following through 
!:iw :og:.c illustrc:,t0.cl in :i'i0m:e 5, one c.:in see that the new average cost 
c~cve CTQ 1 is to the ri.zht of t~:e o.:.::i.einEtl by the ho?:izontal distance be-
anc1 Ds·i) s I Th~ total c..1b::;idy w1_1ich is paid to skilled laborers 
is n p~y2~nt from non-emigrants to people who 
would h~vc e~iz~nt~i in the ab~ence of the policy. The net contribution of 
In our di2-gr2m this gain is clearly 
Until no~1 ue h::ive been coace:::r:i::cd either with a "St.::tj_c or short-run 
ccc:-,:;r:7 in whi.ch t!1::::c~ ic. ;.:::; a:ljustr.~ent of factor p:.:oportions except that 
:?:esuJ. ting c.i.!.·2ctly £::::-o~ 1x:.e~:·at~ i-:m; ·or, Fith a stationary dynarnic econo~r,y in 
,hJ.c:i c~.thc;: inf:i.nitc tine. is available for the systc:n to readjust to shocks 
o~ whe=c all exogenous ch2n3cs nre fo:::2seen and planned for. It is clear 
th3t n0ithcr of these two systc~s is the relevant cme for the analysis of 
,.:.:.st ccu1~-::ri.es an:l t~12.t in c::::-c~er to i-:t c:. r:iore appropriate ans~•7er to the 
1,~tv~ been use:~~ b.qr;j_cal ly c-3C.::u::;e ::!1ey gi.v2. a simpl-::r base from which to an~.. 
in the ei.·o~-;ir.~ cco:x::.y. A,1:: e:uir;r.:,ti..:n r1ill lead in the short run to the 
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Pne might expect that, in a growing econonv, the departure of people 
with low savings rates would benefit the non-emigrants in a long run sense, 
even though there might be the usual short run loss. But consider what 
happens in this case, The rate of return to capital formation will decrease 
since, because the non-emigrants had a higher-savings ratio than the emi­
grants, the ratio of labor to capital will now be lower than it would have 
been had the emigration not occurred and the marginal productivity of any 
given amount of capital will be lower. He know from our earlier analysis 
of the dynamic stationary economy that the increase in wages of the non­
emigrants is insufficient· to offset the decJ:ease in non-wage incomes. This 
initial decrease in.income is felt also in the growing economy and coupled 
with it is a decrease in the return to savings, which will. probably lowe.: 
the rate of capital formation of the non--emigrants below what it would have 
had the emigration not occurred. It is true,·~£ course, that the average 
growth rate of the economy as a whole. will probably be higher after the emi­
gration than before it; but this is just.another example of the apparent 
paradox first referred to in our short-run analysis above (see page ). 
If the emigration had not occurred, the non-emigrants wouLd have gained 
even faster than they now gain, while the emigrants, having a lower income 
per capita ,rnuld. have kept the average income per capita down below what 
it currently is, and would have had a more slowly growing income level.l 
_ 1It is interesting to ask how our results would be affected if we 
allo~.;ed for embodied technical change. If the rate of technological pro­
gress was an increasing function of total investment in the econor:1y as a 
whole, it too would be decreased by the emigration, since total investment 
would be decreased. If, however, the rate of technological progress de­
pended positively on such a variable as the capital-labor ratio, our results 
could be reversed, 
